
GUIDELINE

CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND ARRANGEMENTS



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Acronyms

DMA	Disaster Management Act, 2002 (Act 57 of 2002)
DMC	Disaster Management Centre
DOC	Disaster Operations Centre
DMP	Disaster Management Plan
CA	Contingency Arrangement
CP	Contingency Planning
KPA	Key Performance Area
IAP	Incident Action Plan
IMS	Incident Management System
NDMAF	National Disaster Management Advisory Forum
NSRMS	National Standard Response Management System
NDMC	National Disaster Management Centre
NDMF	National Disaster Management Framework, 2005
PAP	Preparedness Action Plan
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure



Definitions

The following words and expressions will, unless the context otherwise requires or the Disaster Management Act, 2002 (Act No. 57 of 2002) (DMA) or National Disaster Management Framework, 2005 (NDMF) otherwise provides, have the meanings hereby assigned to them namely:-

“Contingency Arrangement” means the resulted plan of a forward planning process for an disastrous event that may occur, in which scenarios and objectives are agreed, managerial and technical actions defined, and potential response systems put in place to mitigate and respond effectively to an emergency situation (Adapted from SA, 2005)



Interrelation / compatibility with other guidelines

This guideline interrelates with the,

- Guidelines for Conducting Comprehensive Disaster Risk Assessments, Part 1: Hazard Identification, Analysis and Prioritisation issued¹ by the NDMC on 25 October 2016,
- Guidelines for the Development and Structure of a Disaster Management Plan issued² by the NDMC on 26 May 2017;
- Guidelines for the Classification and Declaration of a State of Disaster, issued by the NDMC in 2019;
- Guidelines on Conducting an Initial Onsite Assessment, issued by the NDMC in 2019;
- Guideline for Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Agreements, issued by the NDMC in 2019;

¹ Government Gazette No. 40393 on 2 November 2016

² Government Gazette No. 40685 on 26 May 2017



1. Introduction

The Disaster Management Act, 2002 (Act No. 57 of 2002) (DMA) in Section 15, assigns various powers and duties to the National Disaster Management Centre (NDMC) which, amongst others, includes not only advisory and consultative functions, but also, in Section 22, the power to give guidance and advice to stakeholders with regards to disaster management. This guideline in lieu of this responsibility gives guidance on Contingency Planning (CP) and Contingency Arrangements (CA).

2. Purpose of this guideline

This guideline, is developed in terms of sections 25(1)(c)(vi); 38(1)(c)(vi); 39(1)(c)(vi); 39(2)(k); 52(1)(c)(vi) & 53(1)(c)(iv) and 53(2)(k) of the DMA for the respective spheres of government, read with sections 3.2.5.2 and Key Performance Area (KPA) 4 of the National Disaster Management Framework, 2005 (NDMF) to enable organs of state to develop appropriate CAs. This guideline specifies the requirements for the development of a CA and covers the technical aspects, actions and response systems to be put in place for an event that may occur.

3. Scope

This guideline provides a structure to enable CP and lists risk assessment, preparedness, response and action triggers as the four main components of a CA. It also specifies various sub-components for each of these components to be put in place by an organ of state to adequately prepare for and respond to a potential event.

The scope of this guideline therefore seeks to articulate only those aspects related to addressing these four key components of a CA to:



- (i) Determine what disastrous event(s) may occur, detailing the,
 - a. Hazard type that is likely to occur.
 - b. Hazard specific vulnerability and exposure
 - c. Hazard specific capacity to respond.
 - d. Three potential scenarios that may result (worst case-, best case-, and most likely scenario).
 - e. Potential impact.
 - f. Stakeholders involved in preparing for and responding to the disastrous event.
 - g. Roles and responsibilities of the stakeholders involved in preparing for and responding to the disastrous event.
- (ii) Determine what can be done to prepare for the disastrous event, detailing the,
 - a. Planning.
 - b. Organisational structure or integrated stakeholder structure.
 - c. Equipping- and mobilising stakeholder resources.
 - d. Training of stakeholders and exercises.
 - e. Building awareness amongst stakeholders.
- (iii) Determine what can be done in response to the disastrous event detailing the,
 - a. Method(s) and activities to predict and provide early warnings.
 - b. Rapid assessment of the disastrous event to gain and maintain situational awareness.
 - c. Response coordination morphology and institutional structure.
 - d. Damage assessment(s).
 - e. Incident objectives identified.
 - f. The incident action plan for each operational period.
 - g. Response support functions (procurement, logistics, finance etc.)



- (iv) Determine what factors would trigger stakeholders to initiate / suspend their response actions detailing the,
 - a. Notification / activation of stakeholders.
 - b. Demobilisation of stakeholders.

The guideline will not provide the required policies, delegations or Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) required to put a CP into operation. In this regard, the guideline will, where required, only indicate that a particular policy, delegation or SOP is required.

4. How to use this guideline

Effective CP requires strong coordination between the identified stakeholders to develop integrated CAs. The planning process should be both participatory and consultative in nature as it is the foundation on which timely and effective disaster-response operations are built, when the disaster occurs.

Sections 25, 38, 39, 52 and 53 of the DMA, read with sections 3.2.5.2 and Key Performance Area (KPA) 4 of the NDMF sets out the measures that must be taken by stakeholders in the respective spheres of government in order to prepare for and respond to a disaster. This guideline builds on this by extracting and grouping together, in the different 'parts' listed below, the key concepts related to develop and structure a CA. This involves applying the following steps.

Step 1: Determine what disastrous event may occur in a particular area, set out in section 7 of this guideline.

Step 2: Determine what can be done to prepare for the disastrous event, set out in section 8 of this guideline.



Step 3: Determine what can be done in response to the disastrous event, set out in section 9 of this guideline.

Step 4: Determine what factors would trigger stakeholders to activate / deactivate their response actions, set out in section 10 of this guideline.

5. Contingency arrangements in the disaster management plan continuum

The DMA enjoins organs of state across the three spheres of government to develop a Disaster Management Plan (DMP). Sections 25(1)(c)(vi); 38(1)(c)(vi); 39(1)(c)(vi); 39(2)(k); 52(1)(c)(vi) & 53(1)(c)(iv) and 53(2)(k) of the DMA refers to contingency strategies, contingency plans and emergency procedures³ as a component of a DMP. Figure 1 shows this relationship and how a contingency arrangement (with its four components) fits into a DMP.




Figure 1: Contingency Arrangements in the disaster management plan continuum

³ These terms are used interchangeably



The NDMF in sections 3.1.1 recognises that disaster management planning is uneven across the spheres of government. The NDMF then goes on to posit that DMPs be developed in three progressive steps, from a level 1 to a level 3 DMP. CA form part of the priority aspects that must be put in place during the development of a level 1 DMP.

6. Principles of contingency planning

The development of CAs hinges on principles identified that underscore the CP process.

6.1 Contingency planning must be inclusive and reach to the lowest service level

The NDMF in section 3.1.1 and in figure 3.1 emphasises the fact that disaster planning across the spheres of government is not only linked but must be inclusive and reach to the lowest level where service delivery is best provided.

6.2 Commitment to maintain contingency arrangements

CP and CAs requires commitment from all stakeholders. In terms of personnel and financial resources, the information, tasks and procedures detailed in a CA represent that organ of states' demonstrated commitment to preparedness, response, recovery, etc. Therefore, it is essential that the information and action plans flowing from a CA remain viable and be maintained in a state of currency in order to ensure the accuracy of its contents.



It is incumbent upon every individual within an organ of state, who is in receipt of the CA, or any part thereof, or who has a role and/or responsibility for any information or materials contained in the document, to ensure that adequate and sufficient attention and resources are committed to the maintenance and security of the document and its contents.

6.3 Governance and integration

Disaster response to a particular disastrous event is multidisciplinary in nature and involves stakeholders coming together across the spheres of government, the private sector, Non-Governmental Organizations, civil society etc. to coordinate their response efforts in a structured manner. The NDMF in section 4.3.2 posits the use of a National Standard Response Management System (NSRMS) for this purpose once a disastrous event has occurred. However, in the CP process the integration of and collective governance morphology of the disastrous event must receive high priority when preparations are made to promote an integrated response.

6.4 Disaster risk and risk assessment

The NDMF defines 'disaster risk' as the probability of harmful consequences or expected losses (deaths, injuries, property, livelihoods, disrupted economic activity or environmental damage) resulting from interactions between natural or human-induced hazards and vulnerable conditions. The NDMF also defines 'risk assessment' as a process to determine the nature and extent of risk by analysing potential hazards and evaluating existing conditions of vulnerability that could pose a potential threat or harm to people, property, livelihoods and the environment on which they depend.



Where any disaster risk was established through (a) risk assessment(s), significant information is on hand, before an event occurs, on the potential hazards that might occur in an area and the harmful consequences or expected losses⁴ that might result. As such, in the CP process, stakeholders may reliably draw from this information to form a determination of the;

- a) Disastrous event(s) may occur.
- b) Hazard specific vulnerability and exposure.
- c) Hazard specific capacity to respond.
- d) Potential scenario that may result (worst case-, best case-, and most likely scenario).
- e) Potential impact.
- f) Stakeholders involved in preparing for and responding to the disastrous event.
- g) Roles and responsibilities of the stakeholders involved in preparing for and responding to the disastrous event.

6.5 Information management and communication

The NDMF posits that integrated disaster management depends on access to reliable hazard and disaster risk information as well as effective information management and communication systems to enable the receipt, dissemination and exchange of information. Enabler 1, and especially Section 5.4, of the NDMF indicates the specific features required of an information management and communication system to support the four Key Performance Areas (KPA) of the NDMF. In this regard drawing from amongst others, access to EWS, dissemination of early warnings, the directory of names and planning resources (set out in KPA 1); risk assessment, mapping systems, monitoring and tracking hazards (set out in KPA 2); recording, retrieval and updating of specific real-time information during an event, assessment data management, event analysis, situation reporting (set out in KPA 4) etc. is of critical importance.

⁴ Deaths, injuries, property, livelihoods, disrupted economic activity or environmental damage



6.6 Education and training

Developing CAs and presenting it to senior management for approval may satisfy the immediate legislative need of having a documented CA. However, this is not enough if the goal is to have a viable response capability. In order to establish that capability, CAs, and the activities associated with their maintenance (i.e. training, revision, and exercising) must become an integral part of the organs of state operations.

6.7 Funding

Developing a CA is not a one-time commitment and is not a project with an established start and end date. Instead, a CP is an on-going, funded business activity that must be budgeted to provide fiscal resources required to amongst others;

- a) Perform the activities required to perform integrated CP and develop viable CAs (including performing a hazard specific risk assessment).
- b) Establish a Disaster Operations Centre and support its operational needs.
- c) Equip stakeholders with the equipment needed to perform their functions.
- d) Stockpile equipment and other resources.
- e) Perform maintenance on response systems and equipment.
- f) Train and retrain employees and other stakeholders to perform the functions assigned to them in close cooperation and collaboration with other stakeholders
- g) Perform exercises, test strategies, test SOPs, test response teams and their resources capabilities.
- h) Re-exercise unattained exercise objectives.
- i) Develop and revise SOPs as the organ of states' needs changes.
- j) Support operational needs such as fuel, overtime, Subsistence, traveling etc.
- k) Report on-going continuity planning to senior management.
- l) Research processes and technologies to improve preparedness and response systems.



6.8 Evaluation and improvement

Developing a CA is not a one-time commitment. Organisations and the risk(s) they face may change (and do so) more frequently than expected. As such, exercises, incident after action reviews or new information obtained from a risk assessment may require that the CA be re-evaluated and or improved to remain relevant.

6.9 Contingency arrangement approval

As stated already, a CA represent an organ of states' commitment to preparedness, response, recovery, etc. for a particular disastrous event. Such a commitment is demonstrated through the approval of the CA by the highest decision making body of the organ of state. It not only legitimises the CP process but also lends administrative and operational authority to the stakeholders involved in the CA to initiate and execute the actions detailed therein when a disastrous event occurs, without delay or any further approval.

6.10 Standard operating procedures and policy

SOPs (also referred to as policies) in general provides detailed, written instructions to stakeholders on how and when to perform a business activity or process. The sheer amount of business activities or the interrelatedness of some of these business processes drives organisations to develop a number of SOPs. Typical examples of activities dealt with by SOPs includes matters such as working hours, working overtime, using private transport for work related activities, subsistence allowances, communication, booking on and off duty, quality assurance, equipment use, safe driving, conduct with customers (or public), record keeping, occupational health and safety, the use of personal protective equipment, standby duties, substance use, etc.



When properly applied, SOPs enable business efficiency, increase output, improve performance, reduce miscommunication and ensures conformance to legislative requirements. Disasters may occur at any moment thus requiring (a) disaster responder(s) to be available at short notice around the clock to perform tasks related to disaster response as set out in the CA. Given that Disaster Management Centres (DMCs) are located in the public sector, the need for and the proper application of SOPs is not only unavoidable, but is essential to ensure that business processes related to disaster response is performed no matter when the event occurs. As such, the development and implementation of SOPs relating to the examples listed in the above are critical enablers to the initiation and execution of CAs.

7. Determine what disastrous event(s) may occur

7.1 Objective

The objective of this section is to determine the nature and extent of risk by analysing potential hazards and evaluating existing conditions of vulnerability that could pose a potential threat or harm to people, property, livelihoods and the environment on which they depend. The probability of harmful consequences or expected losses (deaths, injuries, property, livelihoods, disrupted economic activity or environmental damage) is the determined from the interactions between natural or human-induced hazards and vulnerable conditions as a function of the available capacity to deal with the risk should it materialise.



7.2 Risk analysis sub-components to be addressed in the CA

The starting point for to develop a CA for a specific disastrous event lies in the knowledge of the hazard; the vulnerabilities (physical, social, economic, environmental etc.) the exposure and the capacity available to take action taken. The following sub-components of risk analysis must be addressed in the CA.

Risk analysis sub-components	Description
Hazard type that is likely to occur.	$\text{Risk} = \text{Hazards} \times \text{Vulnerability} \times \text{Exposure} \div \text{Capacity}$ Extract from the risk assessment, the hazard specific vulnerability, exposure and capacity.
Hazard specific vulnerability and exposure	
Hazard specific capacity to respond.	
Three potential scenarios that may result (worst case-, best case-, and most likely scenario).	An organ of state develop three potential scenarios that may result for the manifestation of the risk (worst case-, best case-, and most likely scenario).
Potential impact.	An organ of state determine the potential impact that may result from the manifestation of the risk.
Stakeholders involved in preparing for and responding to the disastrous event.	An organ of state identify and list the stakeholders involved in preparing for and responding to the disastrous event.
Roles and responsibilities of the stakeholders involved in preparing for and responding to the disastrous event.	An organ of state develop a roles and responsibilities matrix of the stakeholders involved in preparing for and responding to the disastrous event.



8. Determine what can be done to prepare for the disastrous event

8.1 Objective

Preparedness is the knowledge and capacities developed by governments, response and recovery organizations, communities and individuals to effectively anticipate respond to and recover from the impacts of likely or imminent disasters. It is actions carried out before a disastrous event occurs to adequately prepare for the disastrous event and involve planning; organisation; equipping; training and exercises; and building awareness.

8.2 Planning sub-components to be addressed in the CA

Preparedness planning involves establishing preparedness objectives, developing and selecting the goals, formulating preparedness plans, securing participation and cooperation from stakeholders, and performing ongoing review and follow-up. The following sub-components of planning must be addressed in the CA.

Planning sub-components	Description
Preparedness Action Plan (PAP) arrangements	The PAP is an organized course of events that addresses all the aspects of preparedness within a specified time. The PAP formally documents preparedness goals and the operational activities to realise them.
SOPs arrangements	Identifies, lists and develops the SOP needed to facilitate the implementation and maintenance of the CA.



Planning sub-components	Description
Logistical planning arrangements	Identifies and plans the practical arrangements that are necessary for people and equipment to prepare for and support the response to a disastrous event.
Communications planning arrangements	Identifies and plans the communication arrangements that are necessary for people to effectively coordinate and collaborate when preparing for and supporting the response to a disastrous event.
Information management planning arrangements	Identifies and plans the information management arrangements that are necessary for people to effectively coordinate and collaborate when preparing for and supporting the response to a disastrous event.

8.3 Organisation sub-components to be addressed in the CA

The organisation process to prepare for a disastrous event involves reflecting on the preparedness plans and objectives developed; establishing the tasks to be performed; allocating responsibilities and resources for the execution of the tasks; establishing a structure to coordinate the execution of the tasks and evaluate the results. The following sub-components of organisation must be addressed in the CA.

Organisation sub-components	Description
PAP committee	An organ of state must set up an operational structure comprising of stakeholders identified for the purpose, to drive the implementation of the PAP.



Organisation sub-components	Description
NSRMS / IMS arrangements	An organ of state must make the required arrangements to prepare a multi-disciplinary team that is organised and able to manage the disastrous event in an integrated manner using pre-agreed methods of coordination. Whilst the NSRMS or a national IMS is not universally defined, most organs of state follow universal procedures that can be aligned with one another through integration to achieve this objective.
Forward command post / onsite Joint Operations Centre arrangements	An organ of state must make the required arrangements to prepare suitable communication systems that is organised, using pre-agreed methods, and able to facilitate liaison and coordination with forward command posts or other joint operations centres established. Whilst the NSRMS or a national IMS is not universally defined, most organs of state follow universal procedures that can be aligned with one another through integration to achieve this objective.
Sector department & DMC arrangements	An organ of state must make the required arrangements to prepare suitable intergovernmental relations that is organised, using pre-agreed methods, and able to facilitate liaison and coordination between organs of state. Whilst the NSRMS or a national IMS is not universally defined, most organs of state follow universal procedures that can be aligned with one another through integration to achieve this objective.



Organisation sub-components	Description
Cluster system arrangements	An Organ of state must establish mechanisms to participate in any humanitarian relief clusters set up, where needed, to better coordinate the following aspects: a) Camp Coordination, camp management and shelter b) Water, sanitation and hygiene c) Emergency telecommunications d) Food security and nutrition e) Logistics f) Health g) Protection and security h) Education i) Early recovery

8.4 Equipping sub-components to be addressed in the CA

Equipping stakeholders with the right equipment to respond when needed is vitally important. It involves identifying and acquiring the standard and/or surge equipment an organisation may need to use when delivering response services. This element is guided by stakeholder needs, response priorities identified in the CA, capabilities-based planning, and the relevant legislation, policies, operational doctrine, and risk assessments. The following sub-components of equipping must be addressed in the CA.



Equipping sub-components	Description
Capability arrangements	An organ of state must prepare a capability matrix and perform a gap analysis to determine which capabilities is not executable due to a lack of suitable equipment. The organ of state must work to fill the gaps identified to ensure that all services are available when the disastrous event occurs.
Resource arrangements	An organ of state must prepare a resource inventory listing all equipment available to the organ of state in the event of a disaster.
Stockpiling arrangements	An organ of state must stockpile sufficient surge equipment and supplies to ensure that during a disaster sufficient equipment is available.

8.5 Training and exercises sub-components to be addressed in the CA

Training in CP is teaching, or developing in oneself or others, the skills and knowledge that translate into specific useful competencies. Training has specific goals improving capability, capacity, productivity and performance. A disaster exercise on the other hand evaluate an organization's preparedness for a particular disaster and confirms whether the participants execute their roles in the response to the required degree. The following sub-components of training and exercises must be addressed in the CA.



Training and exercises sub-components	Description
Training arrangements for stakeholders	An organ of state must not only train stakeholders in all the facets of contingency planning and executing the tasks of the CA, but must also focus on training needs that may improve coordination, incident management, communication, soft skills ⁵ etc.
Exercise arrangements	An organ of state must make the required arrangements to exercise the organization's preparedness for a particular disaster. This can be achieved using a either a table-top, component exercise, a full scale exercise etc.

8.6 Building awareness sub-components to be addressed in the CA

Public awareness seek to turn available human knowledge into specific local action amongst others prepare for a disaster. It seeks to mobilize people through clear messages, supported with detailed information. Hazard awareness alone however does not lead directly to people adopting risk reduction and preparedness measures. Awareness programmes must also include details for communities to;

- Know what specific actions can be taken by them to prepare.
- Convince them that taking these actions will be effective.
- Believe in their own ability to carry out the tasks.
- Know when and how to react to early warnings.

The following sub-components of building awareness must be addressed in the CA.

⁵ Personal attributes that enable someone to interact effectively and harmoniously with other people.



Building awareness sub-components	Description
Awareness program arrangements	An organ of state must plan for and conduct awareness programs, The program must set out the approach, guiding principles, awareness materials, quality assurance and knowledge management arrangements in line with the national integrated public awareness strategy.

9. Determine what can be done in response to the disastrous event

9.1 Objective

The response component of a CA provide a systematic approach to ensure the effective co-ordination⁶ and management⁷ of operational, tactical and strategic response efforts by stakeholders involved in the response to a disastrous event. It is developed before a disastrous event occurs, should be activated in a systematic way when the disastrous event occurs, and involve early warning; rapid assessment and situational awareness; response coordination; damage assessment; developing incident objectives; Incident Action Planning (IAP); and response support functions .

⁶ Achieved through well defined goals; establishing and maintaining effective intergovernmental structures; communicating effectively; providing inspirational leadership; maintaining supervision across the structure; having appropriate plans and policies that are SMART (Specific, Measureable, Achievable, Relevant and Time-bound); establishing and maintaining cooperation; conducting regular meetings to reflect, review and reinvigorate efforts; and promote inclusiveness.

⁷ Achieved through joint planning, organisation, staffing, directing and controlling.



9.2 Early warning sub-components to be addressed in the CA

Early warning entails issuing timely and effective information, through identified institutions, that allows individuals, households, areas and communities exposed to a hazard to take action to avoid or reduce their risk and prepare for effective response. The following sub-components of early warning must be addressed in the CA.

Early warning sub-components	Description
Early warning system(s) arrangements	An organ of state, acting in collaboration with other organs of state, must work to develop a system that allows detecting and forecasting impending extreme events to formulate warnings on the basis of scientific knowledge, monitoring and consideration of the factors that affect disaster severity and frequency.
Communication and information dissemination arrangements	An organ of state, acting in collaboration with other organs of state, must ensure that an early warning systems include a chain of concerns, namely: understanding and mapping the hazard; monitoring and forecasting impending events; processing and disseminating understandable warnings to political authorities and the population; and undertaking appropriate and timely actions in response to warnings.
Public action	An organ of state must develop messages that is appropriate to the hazard to advise the public on when and how to react to an early warning. This may include messages to evacuate the area, to remain indoors, to wait for further instruction etc.



9.3 Rapid assessment and situational awareness sub-components to be addressed in the CA

A rapid assessment is conducted immediately after the onset of a disastrous event, using secondary data, in order to rapidly assess the magnitude⁸ and severity⁹ of the disaster and the immediate needs of the disaster victims. A rapid assessment also comprises attaining situation awareness to determine the priorities in the early critical stage of a disaster to secure the immediate health and safety of the victims. The following sub-components of a rapid assessment and attaining situational awareness must be addressed in the CA.

Rapid assessment and situational awareness sub-components	Description
Arrangements for the assessment of severity and magnitude.	An organ of state must make arrangements to immediately assess the intensity of the damage and the size or extent of the occurrence. A rapid assessment should assess the; a) security and access to the area; b) population affected c) community resources d) mortality e) morbidity and injuries f) health system and infrastructure g) water h) sanitation i) food and essential items for living

⁸ The size or extent of the occurrence.

⁹ The intensity of the damage



Rapid assessment and situational awareness sub-components	Description
	j) shelter
Arrangements for the assessment of immediate needs	An organ of state must make arrangements to immediately assess the need to; a) Search for missing persons. b) Rescue persons trapped. c) Provide emergency medical care. d) Provide firefighting. e) Secure dangerous sites. f) Provide water, food, sanitation, emergency shelter.

9.4 Response coordination sub-components to be addressed in the CA

The DMA indicates that the responsibility for the co-ordination of response to a disastrous event is allocated to a specific organ of state once a disaster is classified as a local-, provincial- or national disaster. The NDMF states that in creating institutional arrangements for co-operative governance and co-ordination, the emphasis must be on facilitating co-operation and co-ordination among existing structures, organisations and institutions and wherever possible, harnessing existing skills and expertise. Functions normally performed by the various sectors and disciplines in the national, provincial and municipal spheres should not be duplicated. The following sub-components of response coordination must be addressed in the CA.



Response coordination sub-components	Description
DOC arrangements to coordinate response	A DMC must make arrangements to set up and maintain a fully equipped dedicated facility that must be capable of accommodating any combination of emergency and essential services representatives, including all relevant role players and stakeholders identified in response and recovery plans for the purpose of multidisciplinary strategic management of response and recovery operations.
Cluster system arrangements	An Organ of state must participate in any humanitarian relief clusters established by the DOC, where needed, to better coordinate the following aspects: a) Camp Coordination, camp management and shelter b) Water, sanitation and hygiene c) Emergency telecommunications d) Food security and nutrition e) Logistics f) Health g) Protection and security h) Education i) Early recovery
Arrangements for media relations	An organ of state must make arrangements to establish media relations in line with the Government Information and Communications System and or in line with the policies and or SOPs of that organ of state.
Arrangements for cooperation and mutual assistance agreements	Organs of state must foster cooperation and coordination efforts must be supported by cross-



Response coordination sub-components	Description
	boundary mutual assistance agreements and by creating partnerships within each sphere with the private sector and NGOs through memoranda of understanding.

9.5 Damage assessment sub-components to be addressed in the CA

A detailed multi-sector damage and needs assessment is conducted as soon as the immediate emergency phase of the disaster is over and the basic health and safety needs of the victims have been or is being met. It is conducted through a phased approach using secondary and primary data. The following sub-components of damage assessment must be addressed in the CA.

Damage assessment sub-components	Description
Arrangements to conduct a detailed multi-sector damage and needs assessment	Organs of state must make the required arrangements to conduct a detailed damage assessment of its area of responsibility. The organ of state must collaborate with other organs of state and share information so that a consolidated, detailed report can be produced to inform the recovery phase projects.



9.6 Incident objectives sub-components to be addressed in the CA

The practice of breaking complex tasks into smaller sub-tasks that can be achieved over shorter specific period is a well-established construct. CAs must establish specific incident objectives and define the operational period in order to enable planners to determine the main tasks and sub-tasks to be reached. The following sub-components of incident objectives must be addressed in the CA.

Incident objectives sub-components	Description
Arrangements to define objectives for response	An organ of state must define the specific objectives it seeks to be achieved to meet the needs of the affected community in the crisis, relief, and recovery phase.
Incident operational period	An organ of state must define the operational period for the specific hazard. Fast moving incidents like localized flooding may have a 24hr operational period whilst slow moving incidents like drought may have an operational period spanning months. During the operational period the organ of state will, in collaboration with others, identify and process the potential incidents and effects; establish the priority incident objectives; develop the IAP to counteract the effects; and prepare, disseminate and execute the IAP.



9.7 Incident action plan sub-components to be addressed in the CA

The Incident Action Plan (IAP) is an organised course of events that addresses all the phases of an incident within a specified time. An IAP is necessary to effect successful outcomes in any situation, especially emergency operations, in a timely manner. The following sub-components of IAP must be addressed in the CA.

Incident action plan sub-components	Description
IAP arrangements	The IAP formally documents incident goals, operational period objectives, and the response strategy defined by incident command during response planning. It contains general tactics to achieve goals and objectives within the overall strategy, while providing important information on event and response parameters.
Activities matrix arrangements	The organ of state must develop and maintain an activities matrix to track tasks and objectives to be completed and already completed.
Arrangements to issue directives and or Regulations	A DMC must establish and maintain a mechanism to conceptualise, draft, approve and publish in the gazette, those directives and or Regulations ¹⁰ that may be needed to augment existing legislation or CAs.

¹⁰ Bylaws in case of a Council



9.8 Response support functions sub-components to be addressed in the CA

Response support functions are those ancillary activities carried out by an organs of state in order to permit or to facilitate the core response functions. The outputs (results) of support functions internal and are not themselves intended to directly serve the affected communities. The following sub-components of response support functions must be addressed in the CA.

Response support functions sub-components	Description
Emergency procurement arrangements	An organ of state must make the required arrangements to establish emergency procurement procedures / policy that enables the procurement of goods and services in a timely manner.
Logistical arrangements	An organ of state must make the required logistical arrangements to ensure amongst other things the acquisition of goods and services, the movement of goods, facilities management, training, induction, distribution of goods and services etc.
Finance & Administration arrangements	An organ of state must make the required finance and administration arrangements needed to support the response morphology



10. Determine what factors would trigger stakeholders to initiate / suspend their response actions

10.1 Objective

Being prepared for and being able to respond to a disastrous event will serve little purpose when an organ of state reacts too late or do not react in the appropriate manner when the disastrous event occurs. Similarly, organs of state that do not demobilise unused resources when the need arise may increase the cost of the response. For these reasons, factors must be identified in the CP process that will trigger the;

- a) Initiation of the CA at the required moment through the notification and activation of stakeholders.
- b) Suspension of the CA at the required moment through the demobilisation of stakeholders.

10.2 Stakeholder notification and activation sub-components to be addressed in the CA

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The following sub-components of Stakeholder notification and activation must be addressed in the CA.

Stakeholder notification and activation sub-components	Description



Arrangements to trigger the notification and activation of stakeholders	An organ of state must identify the indicators that will set off (trigger) the implementation of the CA requiring the notification and activation of stakeholders. Similar triggers must be identified to trigger the activation of additional resources (surge capacity) using mutual aid agreements or the like.
Stakeholder notification and activation arrangements	An organ of state must establish and maintain a directory of stakeholders. The organ of state must also establish a mechanism to notify and activate stakeholders in short space of time to facilitate timeous response.

10.3 Stakeholder demobilisation sub-components to be addressed in the CA

The following sub-components of stakeholder demobilisation must be addressed in the CA.

Stakeholder demobilisation sub-components	Description
Arrangements to trigger the demobilisation of stakeholders	An organ of state must identify the indicators that will set off (trigger) the suspension of the CA requiring the demobilisation of stakeholders.
Demobilisation arrangements	An organ of state must establish a mechanism to demobilize stakeholders.



11. Recommendations

It is recommended that all organs of state across the spheres of government, and all role-players enjoined by the Disaster Management Act, 2002 (Act 57 of 2002) and the National Disaster Management Framework, 2005 to develop a disaster management plan, have regard for and consider this guideline.



12. Approval

Mr Jurgens Dyssel

Director: Policy Development and Regulatory Frameworks

Date: 29/03/2019

Guideline supported/..... ✓

Ms Ane Bruwer

Chief Director: Policy and Legislation Management

Date: 29/3/2019

Guideline approved/..... ✓

~~Subject to~~ be presented in the MDure
mAnco and the MDmAf

Dr Mmaphaka Tau

Deputy Director-General (Head): National Disaster Management Centre

Date: 29/03/2019



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